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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Defendant and Appellee, 
vs. 
VALDEN CRAM, 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010046-SC 
Priority 12 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal in a criminal case from the Fifth District Court, Washington 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable G. Rand Beacham presiding. The appeal was 
originally taken to the Utah Court of Appeals, which had jurisdiction of the case pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e). After the filing of a timely Notice of Appeal, the 
Utah Court of Appeals dismissed Cram's appeal and this Court granted Cram's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari on April 28, 2001. Hence, this Court has jurisdiction of this matter 
pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2a-4. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Is defendant's re-trial barred by the former jeopardy provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 12, of the Utah 
1 
Constitution, when the Court unilaterally declared a mistrial when the jury had been 
deliberating for less than three and a half hours after a two day jury trial? As the Court 
determined that pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-403 the declaration of a mistrial was 
appropriate, the standard of review is one of correctness. "Legal determinations . . . are 
defined as those which are not of fact but are essentially of rules or principles uniformly 
applied to persons of similar qualities and status in similar circumstances." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved in the trial court by defendant's 
written motion. (See R-810-811, Defendant's motion to dismiss; R-812-821, 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion to dismiss; R-
831-832, plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss; and R-837, court's order 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss.) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with three counts of evading state individual 
income tax, liability for the payment of which allegedly arose during the calendar years 
1991, 1992, and 1993. Each count was alleged as a second degree felony. The pertinent 
state statutes are UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 59-1-401, 59-10-541, and 76-8-1101. (See 
amended information at R-347-348.) Defendant had previously not filed state income tax 
returns on or before the 15th day of April succeeding the close of each of these tax years. 
(See R-802 at pages 93-95; R-846 at page 94.) In 1994, the state tax commission 
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obtained an order of the Third Judicial District Court which directed the Defendant's wife 
to file tax returns for the subject years. Defendant had returns prepared and he filed them 
in deference to the court's order against his wife. (See R-850, State's Exhibit's Nos. 1, 2 
and 3.) 
On August 17, 1998, a jury was impaneled and sworn to try Appellant 
on alleged tax evasion charges. The state's entire case rested upon showing that 
defendant had a tax liability for calendar years 1991, 1992 and 1993. The only evidence 
the state had to show a tax liability for those years was taken from defendant's tax returns 
for those years. (See R-846, pages 95-99.) 
Defendant contended that the tax returns were not admissible as prima facie 
evidence of the accuracy of any entry made or calculation arrived at in the individual 
documents contained therein. (R.846, pp. 146-153.) 
The state relied heavily upon the declarations made in the income tax 
returns which the defendant had been required by court order to file. In his closing 
argument, the prosecutor asked the jury to "take a few minutes to go through Exhibits 1, 
2, and 3, and look at those tax returns that [the appellant] submitted in 1994 
(R.802, page 214.) The prosecutor then went on to tout these exhibits as evidence of 
"income which [appellant] had earned during those three years." Id. Finally, the 
prosecutor "did have a tax obligation under the Utah individual income tax for the year 
1991, the year 1992, and 1993." Id. This, of course, was an element of the offenses 
charged. 
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a. The case went to the jury at 6:48 p.m. on August 18.1 After 
deliberating for about two hours, the jury reported through the bailiff that it was unable to 
reach a verdict. See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, page 227. The district 
court went back on the record at 9:09 p.m., after having previously determined that it 
would charge the jury further, using what is sometimes referred to as a "deadlock 
instruction." At that time, appellant's trial counsel asked the court to declare the 
proceedings a mistrial. See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, pages 227-28. 
The court charged the jury further and at 9:16 p.m. sent it back to deliberate. See R-802, 
transcript of second day of jury trial, page 230; Instruction No. 16. 
b. Shortly thereafter, the court called counsel into chambers for the 
purpose of considering two handwritten notes which the jury had submitted through the 
bailiff. The first considered was the jury's request that it be provided a copy of the text of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-542 which was referenced in the state tax commission 
certificates attached to the face of and which "authenticated" State's Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 
and 3. The note read: "On state Exhibit #3 Utah Code Annotated 59-10-542 (1953 as 
amended) We would like to know what the code says." See R-850, Court's Exhibit No. 
1. 
Section 59-10-542, in relevant part and with our emphasis added, provides: 
1
 All time-clock references are based upon the time signature appearing on the 
official videotape record of the proceedings and not necessarily upon the court's stated 
approximations of the time which were articulated for the record. There are no material 
discrepancies. 
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The certificate of the [state tax] commission to the effect that 
a tax has not been paid, that a return has not been filed, or that 
information has not been supplied, as required by or under the 
provisions of this chapter, shall be prima facie evidence that 
such tax has not been paid, that such return has not been 
filed, or that such information has not been supplied. 
c. The court and counsel briefly discussed this request prior to going on 
the record. During these discussions, the court was apparently laboring under some 
misapprehension concerning the subject matter of the referenced code section.2 The court 
suggested that the reference which the state tax commission certificates made to § 59-10-
542 was apparently made in error. When the court went on the record in chambers at 
9:55 p.m., the state's prosecutor offered the following in response to the jury's request. 
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: As I previously stated, I 
think I'd just tell them that that section is not relevant to their 
analysis of at least that document. I don't know about the 
other two. Since the question didn't ask about the other two, 
do they understand it or not, I don't know. 
See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, page 231. Operating under the same 
misapprehension, appellant's trial counsel offered a suggestion which prompted the 
following response from the prosecutor: 
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: I think that we should 
probably let them know that that was apparently an erroneous 
reference to the code and it should not be considered by them. 
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: I'm just afraid that 
2The introductory heading in § 59-10-542 reads: "Venue of offenses — 
Evidence." The first sentence of the text refers to matters relevant only for the purpose 
of establishing venue. 
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erroneous just sounds bad on my part as far as the evidence. 
The court and counsel considered this second note while still on the record in 
chambers. The question it contained further signaled a potential problem for the 
prosecution, the fact of which now became immediately apparent. That note read: "If 
there is proof from the State of Utah, that income is taxable, By law, Utah law. Was it 
shown in court Today[?]" See R-850, Court's Exhibit No. 2. For obvious reasons, the 
appellant was no longer interested in a mistrial. 
These two notes indicated that the jury had indeed taken the court's supplemental 
instruction to heart and was making a conscientious effort to reach a verdict. 
d. While the court and counsel were still framing responses to the jury's 
notes, the bailiff left the court's chambers and returned a few moments later. It was 10:01 
p.m. When the bailiff opened the door and stood at the threshold, the state's prosecutor 
asked: "No more questions?" When the bailiff responded in the negative, appellant's 
trial counsel commented: "That's what I was expecting." And the state's prosecutor 
quipped: "Once they get rolling."3 The judge was still in the process of completing his 
written responses and invited counsel to review them prior to their submission to the jury. 
The court then went off the record. It was now 10:02 p.m. 
When the court went back on the record only 13 minutes later, the following 
3These exchanges are "on the [videotape] record," but do not appear in the 
transcript. Had the transcriber included these remarks, they would have appeared near the 
bottom of T 233. 
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exchange between the court and the foreperson of the jury began: 
THE COURT: We're again back on the record. The members 
of the jury are returned to the courtroom. The parties are 
present. The attorneys are present. 
Let me ask first of all who was selected as the chairperson of 
the jury? 
(No verbal response on tape.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Holt? 
[THE FOREPERSON]: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And the report I've received through 
the bailiff is that the jury has been unable to reach a 
unanimous decision. Is that correct? 
[THE FOREPERSON]: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you think that any additional 
period of time for deliberation would make any difference? 
[THE FOREPERSON]: No. 
THE COURT: All right. All right, and do you have any 
question that you want to ask about that? There have been a 
couple of notes passed and some response given, although 
perhaps not as much response as you had hoped. Any 
question or -
[THE FOREPERSON]: No. (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: All right. Are those questions that you have 
not sent out to me so far? 
[THE FOREPERSON]: Well, yes and no. 
THE COURT: Yes and no. Okay. All right. I guess I need to 
make sure I understand then. If there were a couple of 
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questions answered, do you think you could reach a verdict or 
it would be at least worth deliberating longer or do you think 
that would just confirm the positions of decisions that the 
jurors have reached? 
[THE FOREPERSON]: Well, speaking for myself, it would 
probably (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Okay. All right. 
Counsel, is there any record that you would like to make at 
this point? 
[APPELLANT'S COUNSEL]: I don't have anything, your 
Honor. 
[THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. All right. 
Well, ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm not going to 
require you to stay any longer. I am going to release you 
from your duties here and excuse you to go home. 
See R-802, transcript of second day of jury trial, pages 234-35. 
e. When the district court set the matter back on the trial calendar, the 
appellant moved to dismiss on a "plea" of once in jeopardy. Upon hearing the motion, 
the court agreed that the petitioner had not consented to the discharge of the jury and the 
termination of the prior proceedings. However, the lower court denied the motion, 
relying upon the language of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-l-403(4)(c)(iv) and concluding that 
petitioner's trial had been properly terminated. 
Cram timely filed a Notice of Appeal with the Utah Court of Appeals. The Court 
of Appeals concluded that inasmuch as Cram had made no objection to the trial court's 
8 
decision to declare a mistrial, he "failed to adequately preserve his objections" and 
affirmed the district court. (See, photocopy of the Utah Court of Appeals unpublished 
slip opinion issued in this matter, attached as Addendum No. 7). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
I. PETITIONER DID NOT CONSENT TO THE MISTRIAL IN THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
In this case, in denying Cram's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court reasoned that 
defendant's trial was properly terminated under UTAH CODE ANN. §76-1-403. That 
section states that a criminal trial may be properly, although prematurely, terminated 
where the trial court "finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary 
because the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict." The analysis which led the district 
court to deny defendant's motion was arguably limited to the application of the plain 
language of the statute and did not involve any consideration of the constitutional context 
within which the statue necessarily operates. The Utah Court of Appeals, while affirming 
the trial court's ruling in this regard, additionally concluded that inasmuch as the 
defendant made no objection contemporaneously with the declaration of the mistrial, he 
failed to adequately preserve his objection. Slip op., at 1-2. The opinion then goes on to 
indicate that because the defendant failed to raise the issue in the trial court, the issue 
cannot be considered on its merits on appeal. Slip op., at 2. 
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In point of fact, the defendant did raise the issue in the trial court. The record 
clearly demonstrates that the defendant moved the trial court to dismiss the charges when 
the matter came on for scheduling. (R.810-811, motion to dismiss; R.812-821, 
memorandum of points and authorities in support of defendant's motion to dismiss; 
R.831-832, plaintiffs response to defendant's motion to dismiss, and R.834-836, order 
denying defendant's motion to dismiss. Indeed, the Court of Appeals concedes this fact. 
See Slip op., at 1, fh. 2. In sum and substance, the Court of Appeals concluded that in 
failing to make a contemporaneous objection, he consented to the mistrial and could not 
effectively raise the issue thereafter in the trial court or on appeal. By framing the issue 
in terms of defendant's alleged failure to raise the issue in the trial court, the court of 
appeals avoided addressing the real issue, namely, whether the defendant consented to the 
mistrial. In so doing, the court of appeals sidestepped the necessity of deciding this case 
in the context of controlling caselaw, to-wit: State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 
1979) and State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993). 
"The double jeopardy protection is not so ephemeral that it vanishes if an accused 
does not anticipate and object to every unexpected action on the part of the court." 
Ambrose, 598 P.2d, at 360-61. Mere silence or failure to object to the jury's discharge is 
not such consent as will constitute waiver of a former jeopardy plea. State v. Fenton, 19 
Ariz. App. 274, 506 P.2d 665 (1973); People v. Compton, 6 Cal.3d 55, 98 Cal.Rptr. 217, 
490 P.2d 537 (1971); Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. 105, 196 A.2d 382 (1964). See 
generally, Annot. 63 A.L.R.2d 782 § 5 (1959). 
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In State v. Nilson, 854 P.2d 1029 (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court's ruling that the accused could not be retried where the state moved for 
dismissal when the alleged victim unexpectedly changed her testimony regarding the date 
of the alleged offense. The state contended that Nilson had consented to the termination of 
his first trial when his counsel stated: "I have no objection to the motion to dismiss." The 
court noted: 
The facts of this case do not allow us to construe Nilson's articulated lack of 
objection as constituting consent to the State's motion to dismiss. . . . When 
the State moved for dismissal to expedite the inevitable [acquittal], Nilson 
had no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a subsequent 
reprosecution. Nor should he be required to actively oppose the dismissal of 
charges against him and insist that the inevitable scenario be played out, on 
pain of losing his protections under the double jeopardy clause. Given the 
dialogue about a probable directed verdict, the rapidity of the proceedings, 
and lack of argument by the State that the circumstances constituted "legal 
necessity" for declaration of a mistrial, we find Nilson's response was 
inadequate to constitute consent. 
Id., at 1032. 
In the course of considering defendant's motion to dismiss in the instant case, the 
State argued that as the defendant had requested a mistrial, prior to the Court's sua sponte 
declaring a mistrial, that he had in some fashion consented to the mistrial. (R.826-827.) 
The trial court obviously rejected that argument instead holding that pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-1-403 a declaration of a mistrial was proper. (R.835.) The defense 
articulated by defendant in this matter was that the State had been unable to produce any 
evidence that defendant had a tax liability other than the possibly erroneous tax returns of 
defendant. (R.850, State's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3.) After defendant had requested the 
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mistrial, the jury sent a note requesting guidance as to whether the state had proven that 
defendant had taxable income pursuant to Utah law. (R.850, Court's Exhibit No. 2.) At 
that point, it was obvious that the jury had taken the trial court's deadlock instruction 
seriously and was considering the evidence before it. The trial court refused to find that 
defendant had consented to a mistrial and there is no reason to disturb that finding on 
appeal. 
If the rule of law which the court of appeals has applied in deciding this case had 
been applied in Ambrose and Nilson, the defendants in those cases would have been 
subject to further prosecution. Neither of them objected to the termination of the 
proceeding. Like the defendant in the instant case, the defendants in those cases raised 
their objections after the state took steps to further prosecute the matters. 
The court of appeals' reliance on State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tfll, 10 P.3d 346 is 
clearly misplaced. Quoting Holgate, the court of appeals concluded that "[a] defendant 
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the strategy of 'enhancing] 
the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy fails, . . . claiming] on appeal 
that the Court should reverse.'" Slip op., at 2. In Holgate, the defendant withheld any 
objection until after he was convicted. In this instant case, as in other former-jeopardy 
cases, the defendant has not been convicted, nor is there reason to conclude that he 
necessarily would have been had the proceedings continued to verdict. The defendant did 
not remain silent while flawed proceedings continued to a conviction. He stood mute 
while the court terminated a trial in which he may well have been acquitted. He was under 
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"no obligation to warn that double jeopardy might bar a subsequent reprosecution." 
Mfao/i,854P.2d,atl032. 
In United States ex rel Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 
414 U.S. 1023 (1973), the defendant moved for a mistrial after learning that the jury was 
deadlocked. The trial court did not specifically rule on the motion but sent the jury to a 
motel for the evening. The following day, without consulting either the defense or 
prosecution, the trial court granted a mistrial because the jury was exhausted. The 
defendant objected to the mistrial after the jury had been dismissed. In concluding that the 
defendant did not consent to the mistrial even though the trial court stated that it was 
granting the defendant's motion from the previous day, the court reasoned that the 
defendant's motion was made for reasons different than that upon which the court ruled, 
the defendant could have concluded that there was a strong possibility for a verdict and 
therefore his assessment of his chances for an acquittal changed, and the defendant had no 
opportunity to object when the court declared a mistrial. Id., at 16. The court wrote, "We 
see no reason to lock him into a motion once it is made." Id. 
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 379 Mass. 607, 400 N.E.2d 242 (1980), defendant 
Jones was tried with a co-defendant, one Frank Rivera, who was represented by separate 
counsel. During the impanelment of the jury the judge made a number of caustic remarks 
about both defense counsel, apparently prompted by their conduct. The most serious was 
an exchange between the trial judge and Jones's counsel which tended to disparage 
Jones's counsel's legal ability. After the jurors were excused Rivera's counsel made an 
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oral motion for mistrial in which Jones's counsel joined. The court denied the oral 
motion. The next morning, Jones filed a written motion for mistrial. The record contained 
no references to the written motion until a discussion which occurred six days later 
concerning whether a mistrial ought to be granted. 
Contrary to the Commonwealth's expectations as expressed in the prosecutor's 
opening statement, the government's eyewitness did not identify Jones as having been at 
the scene of the crime. As a result of this failure of proof, counsel for Jones said little or 
nothing for the first two days of testimony and Jones obtained directed verdicts at the close 
of the Commonwealth's case on two of the four indictments. 
Later, when Rivera made a second motion for mistrial, Jones objected. The court 
informed Jones that he was granting his prior motion for a mistrial, which had been taken 
under advisement. Counsel then formally waived the earlier motion, explaining that it had 
been based on the events occurring during impanelment and that any prejudice arising in 
that regard had since been abated. The proceedings were thereafter declared a mistrial. 
Jones's motion to dismiss the remaining indictments on double jeopardy grounds was 
denied and he appealed. 
The Appeals Court concluded that Jones had not consented to the mistrial by filing 
a motion for mistrial based on the jury impanelment, that there was no judicial 
overreaching and that on the record the Commonwealth had demonstrated a "manifest 
necessity" for the mistrial. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 383, 387 
N.E.2d 1187 (1979). Upon further appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
14 
the high court agreed that Jones had not consented to the mistrial, but concluded that the 
record did not support the conclusion that there was "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. 
The remaining indictments were ordered dismissed. 
Although the trial court had purported to act upon Jones's mistrial motion, the 
Commonwealth did not contend that Jones had consented to the mistrial. Instead, the 
Commonwealth argued that by not requesting a hearing and a ruling on his written motion 
for a mistrial Jones contributed to the ultimate declaration of a mistrial, an argument not 
unlike the one which the state has advanced in the instant case. In holding that Jones had 
not "contributed" to the granting of the mistrial, the Massachusetts court noted that Jones's 
oral motion had been denied at the time it was made. Since the written motion set forth 
essentially the same grounds, Jones could well have concluded that the written motion had 
been denied. Moreover, a "request for a mistrial may, with the mere passage of time, be 
considered as having been improvidently made and fortunately denied." Id., at 621. The 
court concluded: 
A defendant is entitled to withdraw a motion for mistrial which is initially 
not granted and then later revived by the court. If a Judge decides to rest the 
decision to declare a mistrial on a defendant's earlier motion, the Judge must 
inquire whether the defendant wishes to maintain the motion. See Note, 
Jeopardy and Mistrials, 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 449, 557 (1977). If the defendant 
makes it clear in answer to the Judge's inquiry that he wishes to withdraw 
the earlier motion for a mistrial, the Judge must then decide whether there is 
"manifest necessity" for a mistrial over the defendant's objection. If the 
motion for mistrial is withdrawn by the defendant, the Judge may not rely on 
the earlier request for mistrial as permitting a mistrial by consent. "Where 
the request for mistrial is not granted and the trial proceedings resume, the 
defendant is again entitled to resume control over the course of those 
proceedings, a control which would be meaningless if subject to defeasance 
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through a purported grant of a request made prior to the resumption of 
control." Braxton v. United States, 395 A.2d 759, 767 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978). 
See Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, cert, denied, 423 U.S. 934 
(1975); United States ex rel. Russo v. Superior Court, 483 F.2d 7 (3d Cir.), 
cert denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973); Maes v. District Court, 180 Colo. 169 
(1972). 
Id., at 621-22. Cf. Gershon v. Sardonia, 50 Misc. 2d 423, 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) 
("During the course of a trial the picture constantly changes and a motion made and denied 
may eventually benefit the party who moved"); United States v. McCambridge, 551 F.2d 
865, 872 (1st Cir. 1977) ("concerns which led counsel to file the motion . . . [may be] 
dissipated in light of later events . . ."); Lovinger v. Circuit Court, 845 F.2d 739, 743-44 
(7th Cir.), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 851 (1988) (defendant did not consent to mistrial despite 
his earlier motion because his motion was perfunctory, the court's mistrial was based on 
another ground, the court did not mention the earlier decision, and that because of the 
State's "foibles," the defendant's assessment of his chances of acquittal may well have 
changed). In the instant case, defendant's motion for mistrial was motivated by defense 
counsel's desire to avoid having the jury instructed further. R 802, at pp. 227-28. Clearly, 
there is some legitimate concern that an Allen instruction may compromise the defendant's 
right to the independent judgment of each individual jury. See Allen v. United States, 164 
U.S. 492 (1896); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992). That motion was denied 
and the jury was sent back to deliberate further. 
In this case, in the Court below, when the court and counsel next conferred it was 
for the purpose of formulating responses to questions from the jury, not for the purpose of 
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discussing any continuing deadlock. While the jury had not arrived at a consensus, it was 
deliberating. Jurors may not reach agreement for days, but as long as they are 
deliberating, they are not deadlocked. 
When the court went back into session, the court began questioning the foreperson 
concerning the state of the jury's deliberations. R 802, at pp. 234-37. The court then, 
without first indicating to counsel its intention to do so, declared the proceedings a 
mistrial. Following his questioning of the foreperson, the court asked counsel if they 
wanted to make a further record. Had the court stated that it intended to declare a mistrial 
or that it was entertaining the motion which the defendant had previously made, counsel 
would have had an opportunity to indicate whether he intended to maintain or withdraw 
the motion, if indeed the motion remained extant. It does not require an experienced trial 
lawyer or an exceptional jurist to recognize the fact that the circumstances had 
substantially changed with the submission of the questions from the jury. 
The district court did not indicate that it was reconsidering defendant's spent 
motion as a basis for declaring a mistrial because the court did not resort to the motion as a 
basis for terminating the proceedings. Indeed, in denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
on double jeopardy grounds, the lower court had the intellectual integrity to concede that 
the court had declared the mistrial on the basis of its perception of necessity rather than 
attempting to assign the termination of the proceedings to the defendant's motion or his 
consent manifest in some other manner. 
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Clearly, the defendant did not consent to or otherwise seduce the district court into 
declaring the mistrial. 
POINT II 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT'S RULING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY A 
SHOWING THAT "MANIFEST NECESSITY" REQUIRED MISTRIAL 
IN INTERESTS OF JUSTICE. 
A. Before the District Court May Declare a Mistrial, There Must be 
Manifest Necessity for Such a Determination. 
The court of appeals briefly turned its attention to the merits of defendant's 
contention regarding the determination which had been reached by the trial court on the 
merits of the case, noting: "Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy 
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change." Slip op., at 2. After making this 
observation, the court of appeals simply cited caselaw without engaging in any real 
analysis of the law in the context of the facts of this case. 
The trial court's discretion in discharging the jury is far from unbridled. There 
must be a factual basis for the exercise of this discretion. Otherwise stated: "When 
ordering a mistrial, the trial court must support its ruling by showing that legal necessity 
required mistrial in interests of justice." State v. Castle, 951 P.2d 1109 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998) (Quoting State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354, 358 (Utah 1979)). Moreover, this 
discretion is properly exercised only in "very extraordinary and striking circumstances." 
Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100 (1963). 
In assessing the propriety of the premature termination of a criminal trial, "[w]e 
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resolve any doubt 'in favor of the liberty of the citizen, rather than exercise what would be 
an unlimited, uncertain, and arbitrary judicial discretion."' Id., at 738, 83 S.Ct, at 1035-
36 {quoting United States v. Watson, 28 Fed.Cas. 499, 501). 
The trial court faced with the decision of whether it should prematurely terminate a 
criminal trial ordinarily finds itself on the horns of a very real dilemma. On the one hand, 
if it discharges the jury when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the accused 
is deprived of his "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal," 
Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S., at 503, and upon retrial will likely suffer additional 
disadvantage as a consequence of the aborted proceedings.4 On the other hand, if the court 
fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after "protracted and 
exhausting" deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from 
pressures inherent in the situation rather than from the considered judgment of, in the 
instant case, eight independent triers of fact. Id., at 509. 
In the case before the court, the status of the deliberations cannot reasonably be 
described as "protracted" or "exhausting" and the attendant circumstances certainly were 
not of such a nature as would have created any legitimate concern that, unless the court 
acted quickly in discharging the jury, pressures inherent in the ongoing deliberations 
would likely produce a "false" verdict. Only thirteen minutes elapsed between the time 
the court went off the record after consulting with counsel concerning the propriety and 
4See footnote 2, supra. 
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content of its proposed written responses to the jury's inquiries and that point in time when 
the court went back on the record with the parties present and the jury in the box and 
began questioning the jury foreperson concerning a "reported" deadlock. The jury would 
have scarcely had time to review, let alone consider and implement, the court's responses 
to its handwritten notes. 
In the absence of any real pressure suggesting the need to immediately terminate 
the proceeding based upon the risk of an impending false verdict, there was little if 
anything which could have arguably justified the abandonment of efforts to preserve the 
petitioner's "valued right" to have his "confrontation with society" concluded in that 
proceeding. The premature termination of a criminal trial under such circumstances as 
existed in the instant case is a clear abuse of discretion, unless it is abundantly clear that 
further deliberations would have been so meaningless as to be unjustifiable on the basis of 
nothing more than the mere inconvenience of the additional time spent. 
Some guidance is provided § 5.4(c) by as Standards Relating to Trial by Jury 
(Approved Draft 1968): "The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a 
verdict if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement." Emphasis 
added. Cf. Muniz v. State, 573 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (jury may be 
discharged once it appears "altogether improbable" that it could agree upon a verdict). 
Such a showing may be based upon the jury's concession that it is hopelessly deadlocked, 
provided its deliberations have been of such duration as to indicate that the jury has had 
time to consider the evidence in its complexity or its simplicity. 
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B. Length of Deliberations vs. Complexity of the Case. 
While the jury's acknowledgment of hopeless deadlock is a circumstance which 
may justify the discharge of the jury, in exercising that discretion, the trial court should 
consider the length of the deliberations in light of the length of the trial and the volume 
and complexity of the evidence. See State v. Boogaard, 90 Wash. 2d 733, 739, 585 P.2d 
789 (1978). Otherwise stated, the exercise of discretion in declaring a mistrial will be 
judged by the amount of time the jury deliberates in light of the nature of the case and the 
time that it took the parties to present the evidence. Muniz v. State, supra; Beeman v. 
State, 533 S.W.2d 799 (Tex.Cr.App.1976); O'Brien v. State, 455 S.W.2d 283 
(Tex.Cr.App.1970). 
This discretion, then, must be measured by the time they are kept together 
since the improbability that they will agree is made to depend upon the time. 
. . . Reasonable time is not the measure of his (judge's) discretion. . . . The 
jury must have been kept together for such time as to render it altogether 
improbable that they can agree. . . . Not that they would, but that they could 
agree. 
Powell v. State, 17 Tex. Crim. 345 (1885). 
If the jury declares that it is deadlocked before it has had sufficient time to consider 
all the relevant evidence, its "concession" is not a declaration of its inability to 
purposefully deliberate further, but one of its unwillingness to do so. Jurors who contend 
that there is no reasonable probability of reaching an agreement with their fellow jurors, 
when they have not first taken the opportunity to review and discuss everything which 
must be considered before a reasonable person would determine to stand for a certain 
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position, simply do not understand their duty as trial jurors. Their unwillingness to agree 
with fellow jurors is not born of a conscientious devotion to the duty which they undertook 
by oath. 
A juror's first responsibility is to consider all of the evidence before arriving at an 
opinion. His second responsibility is to engage in meaningful dialogue with his fellow 
jurors so that each may consider the opinions of the other and the factual and legal bases 
advanced in support thereof. It is only after he has completed this process that it becomes 
his duty, as a matter of conscience, to stand for that position which in his judgment is 
supported by the law, the facts, and the justice of the cause. 
The trial court that is confronted with premature protestations of deadlock, has a 
duty to educate that jury and to charge it anew. That is what "deadlock instructions" are 
made for; that is when they are not only permissible but necessary. 
If the court discharges the jury upon its declaration of deadlock, the exercise of its 
discretion in so doing will be judged as a function of the time spent in deliberations in 
relationship to the time required to present the relevant evidence. In Powell v. State, 
supra, the appellate court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in discharging the 
jury after they had only deliberated for three and one half hours. See also O'Brien v. State, 
supra (jury deliberated one hour and ten minutes); Beeman v. State, supra, (two hours); 
Grigsby v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 484, 257 S.W.2d 110 (App.1953) (one hour and forty-
five minutes). Cf. Satterwhite v. State, 505 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (jury 
deliberated three times as long as was required to present the evidence); Willis v. State, 
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518 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (deliberated three times as long as it took the parties 
to put on their cases); Brown v. State, 508 S.W.2d 91 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) (deliberated 
nearly 13 hours over a three-day period after evidence was presented in less than one day). 
In the instant case, even if the district court were absolutely convinced that each 
juror was of the firm opinion that further deliberations would avail nothing, it could not 
have reasonably acted thereon. The questions which the jury had asked of the court 
clearly indicated concern, and therefore apparent disagreement among the jurors, about 
the evidentiary significance of the state's documentary exhibits and the sufficiency of any 
other evidence presented for the purpose of establishing that the defendant had earned 
income which created an individual income tax liability. The district court could not have 
reasonably concluded that the jury had had sufficient time for each juror to reevaluate his 
or her position in light of the further direction they had received from the court. 
But even more troubling was the perfunctory manner and speed with which the jury 
was discharged on the basis of this "report" of deadlock, is the absence of anything in the 
record which indicates that the jury had in fact professed deadlock after it had received 
and considered the court's responses to its handwritten notes. 
C. The Jury's Declaration of Deadlock. 
An equally serious concern arises from the method which the district court 
employed in finding that the jury was in fact "deadlocked." The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has stated: 
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While the length of deliberations is a relevant factor [in determining whether 
to discharge a jury], the more important consideration is whether there is a 
possibility that the jury can reach a verdict within a reasonable time. The 
most reliable source as to this information is the jury itself. 
United States v. Lansdown, 460 F.2d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 1972). Cf. Commentary, ABA 
Standards § 5.4(c). Obviously, if the jury, through its foreman and of its own accord, 
acknowledges that it is hopelessly deadlocked, there may be a factual basis for discharge 
"//the other jurors agree with the foreman." State v. Jones, 97 Wash. 2d 159, 641 P.2d 
708 (1982) (emphasis added). 
Some jurisdictions explicitly favor questioning the individual juror concerning his 
or her perception of the status of the deliberations; none have forbidden it. The ABA 
commentary reflects the rule in California that, 
Ordinarily the trial judge should not discharge a jury on the ground that there 
is no reasonable probability that the jury can agree without questioning the 
jurors individually as to such probability. 
Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 7, 22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641 (1962) 
(emphasis added). The failure of the trial judge to inquire of the individual jurorfs ability 
to reach a verdict has been held by the Alaska Supreme Court to be a factor in determining 
whether the judge discharged the jury prematurely. Koehler v. Alaska, 519 P.2d 442 
(Alaska 1974). Preferable practice demands that the trial court first caution the jury that 
only a "yes" or "no" response is desired and then ask each juror if he or she agrees that a 
hopeless deadlock which could not be resolved by further deliberations exists. See United 
States ex rel Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034 (3d Cir. 1975); United 
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States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 851 (9th Cir. 1974), cert, denied 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428, 
43 L.Ed.2d 673; State v. Nelson, 234 N.W.2d 368 (Iowa 1975); Paulson v. Superior Court 
of El Dorado County, supra. 
The record in the instant case indicates that the court asked a few cursory questions 
of the jury foreperson after the jury had purportedly, for a second time, indicated an 
impasse at reaching a verdict. The court's examination came after a brief consultation 
with counsel, in chambers, regarding the two questions that had then been put to the court 
by the jury. 
The court did not inquire as to whether or not the jurors were "able to deliberate 
further," but only whether, in the opinion of the foreperson, further deliberations might be 
worthwhile. The foreperson's response to this inquiry is not clear from the record: 
THE COURT: . . . . If there were a couple of questions answered, do you 
think you could reach a verdict or it would be at least worth deliberating 
longer or do you think that would just confirm the positions or decisions that 
the jurors have reached? 
THE FOREPERSON]: Well, speaking for myself, it would probably 
(inaudible). 
(R.802, at page 253.) If the jurors could still deliberate, which they were apparently 
willing to do, the jury should have been required to make the attempt. 
Moreover, the jury foreperson did not claim to speak for the other members of the 
jury in responding to the court's question concerning the probable value of any further 
deliberation. Indeed, he made a point of expressly disclaiming the ability to or propriety 
of attempting to answer for anyone other than himself: "Well, speaking for myself, it 
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would probably (inaudible)." Emphasis added. (R.802, at pp. 235-236.) The record does 
not satisfactorily demonstrate the basis of the district court's decision to discharge the jury 
and declare a mistrial. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendant respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the Utah Court of Appeal's Memorandum Decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of August, 2001. 
®PY 
AARON J. PRISBREY 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant. 
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Utah Supreme Court Laura B. Dupaix 
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Salt Lake City UT 84111-0210 PO Box 140854 
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ADDENDUM NO. 1 
AMENDMENT V TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land 
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; 
nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use. 
ADDENDUM NO. 2 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (1999) 
§12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor 
a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same 
offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination 
to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the 
defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
ADDENDUM NO. 3 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
PART 4. MULTIPLE PROSECUTIONS AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-403 
§ 76-1-403. Former prosecution barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same 
episode 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a single 
criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out 
of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried 
under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent 
with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the trier 
of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense even 
though the conviction for the lesser included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, 
or vacated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted 
by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place before 
the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has 
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the 
first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state makes 
it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-1-403, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-403; 1974, ch. 32, § 
3. 
ADDENDUM NO. 4 
PAUL DAME # 
Deputy Washington County Attorney 
178 North, 200 East 
St. George, Utah 84770 
WADE WINEGAR #5561 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM #1231 
Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
VALDEN CRAM, 
Defendant, : 
ORDER 
CASE NO. 961501097 
JUDGE G. RAND BEACHAM 
On Monday, February 1, 1999, a hearing was held before the Honorable Judge G. Rand 
Beacham on the above captioned case regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant was 
present and represented by counsel Aaron J. Prisbey. Assistant Attorney General Wade S. 
Winegar represented the State. After hearing argument from both counsel, the Court makes the 
following findings and order: 
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The Court hereby finds that according to U.C.A. 76-1-403 and Utah case law on the 
issue, the mistrial declared in this matter on August 18, 1998 was not an improper termination of 
the prosecution and resulted because the jury was unable to agree upon a verdict. The Court 
further finds a proper record was made at the time the mistrial was declared and thus orders as 
follows: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be denied. 
Dated this ffr^day of February, 1999. 
(^,cy^^ 
G. Rand Beacham 
District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form 
Aaron J. Prisbey 
Counsel for Defendant 
Certificate of Service 
I certify that on the day of February, 1999,1 sent or caused to be sent, by First Class 
Mail and Fax, a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Order to the following: 
Aaron J. Prisbey 
1071 east 100 South Bldg. D, Suite 3 
St. George, Utah 84770 
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ADDENDUM NO, 7 
.--•" IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Valden Cram, 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
nuuu 
Utah Court of Appeals 
DEC 2 1 2000 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 990506-CA 
F I L E D 
(December 21, 2000) 
2000 UT App 375' 
Fifth District, St. George Department 
The Honorable G. Rand Beachanf 
Attorneys: Aaron J. Prisbrey, St. George, for Appellant 
Jan Graham and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for 
Aooellee 
Before Judges Jackson, Davis, and Thome. 
THORNS, Judge: 
Defendant Valden Cram appeals from an order denying his 
motion to dismiss a subsequent charge, following the trial 
court's declaracion of mistrial. We affirm. 
Defendant argues that the trial courtfs denial of his motion 
to dismiss violates the Fifth Amendment right against being" twice 
cut in jeopardy for the same criminal offense.1 We disagree. 
Defendant's mocion to dismiss followed the trial court's decision 
to declare a mistrial after determining that the jury was unable 
to reach a verdict. Defendant made no objection to the trial 
court's decision to declare a mistrial.2 We have explained that 
1. Defendant also argues that the trial court's dismissal of his 
motion violates Utah Const, art. I, § 12, but he presents this 
court no independent analysis of how the trial court's ruling 
violates the State constitutional provision, therefore, we do not 
address this issue. See Utah R. App. P. 24. 
2. In fact, defendant waited until the scheduling conference for 
the new trial to alert the court of his objection to the 
(continued...) 
"Utah courts require specific objections in order 'to bring all 
claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court 
an opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.f" State v. 
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added) 
(citation omitted). This is particularly true where, as here, 
the trial court could have resolved defendant's timely objection 
before the jury was discharged. 
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court 
may not be raised on appeal." State v. Holaate, 2000 UT 74,1111, 
10 P.3d 346 (citing State v. Marvin, "964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 
1998)). The preservation rule, as it is known, "applies to every 
claim, including constitutional questions." Id. (emphasis 
added). Utah does, however, recognize three exceptions to the 
preservation rule: (1) plain error, (2) exceptional 
circumstances, and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
State v. Irwin, 924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
Defendant fails to argue any of these three exceptions to 
the preservation rule. Rather, defendant acknowledges that he 
knew the court was contemplating a mistrial, but believed he was 
not obligated to object. Defendant was in error. "[A] defendant 
should not be permitted to forego making an objection with the 
strategy of 'enhanc[ing] the defendant's chances of acquittal and 
then, if that strategy fails, . . . claim[ing] on appeal that the 
Court should reverse.1" Holcate, 2000 UT 74 at 1J11 (alterations 
in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, defendant has 
failed to adequately preserve his objection. 
Were we to address the merits of defendant's double jeopardy 
claim, our ultimate conclusion would not change. The Utah 
Supreme Court has explained that "[w]hen . . . the jury is unable 
to reach a verdict, . . . a defendant may be retried 
notwithstanding the double jeopardy clause." State v. Musselman, 
667 P.2d 1061, 1065 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added) (citing Lee v. 
United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S. C t. 2141 (1977); State v. 
Jaramillo, 25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State v. Gardner, 
62 Utah 62, 217 P. 976 (1923); United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 
82, 98 S. Ct. 2187 (1980)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403(4) 
(1999) (codifying the protection against double jeopardy). 
However, "Utah courts have interpreted the protection against 
double jeopardy . . . to mean that upon the declaration of 
mistrial, a defendant may not be retried on the same charge 
unless a 'legal necessity' justified termination of the trial." 
West Vallev Citv v. Patten. 1999 UT App 149,110, 981 P.2d 420 
(citation omitted). 
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In Patten, we set forth the standards previously articulated 
by our supreme court in State v. Ambrose, 598 P.2d 354 (Utah 
1979), for determining whether "legal necessity" exists for 
granting a mistrial. First, the "trial court must give an 
explanation for its decision and discuss possible 'curative 
alternatives to a mistrial.'" Patten, 1999 UT App 14 at ^11 
(citation omitted). "Second, the trial court must enter findings 
of fact supporting its decision . . . ." Id. Finally, the trial 
court "may not declare a mistrial 'so abruptly . . . that 
defendant's counsel ha[s] no opportunity to object.'" Id. 
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
In the present matter, the trial court, on two separate 
occasions, inquired of the jury foreperson whether additional 
deliberation time or the court answering additional questions 
would facilitate a verdict. On both occasions, the jury 
foreperson responded "no." We conclude that the trial court 
discussed "'possible curative alternatives to a mistrial.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). 
The dialogue between the trial court and the jury 
foreperson, the subsequent Minute Entry chronicling the time the 
jury deliberated, the court's supplemental "deadlock" instruction 
to the jury, and the time spent conferring with counsel--all 
contained in the record--demonstrate that sufficient grounds 
exist to support the trial court's declaration of mistrial. We 
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
declaring a mistrial. 
Finally, the trial court clearly did "not declare a mistrial 
'so abruptly . . . that defendant's counsel ha [d] no opportunity 
to object.'" Id. (quoting Ambrose, 593 P.2d at 360). The trial 
court, on two separate occasions, asked defendant's counsel if he 
would like to go on record in response to the jury's inability to 
reach a verdict or inquire of the jury foreperson. Defendant's 
counsel declined on both occasions. Accordingly, we are 
convinced than the trial court complied with the standards set 
forth in Ambrose and that a "'legal necessity' justified 
termination of [defendant's] trial." Id. at 1fl0 (citation 
omitted). The trial judge was properly exercising his discretion 
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when he declared a mistrial. Double jeopardy does not bar 
defendant's subsequent retrial and conviction. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss is affirmed. 
William A. Thorne, Jr.,''Judge 
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